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I. INTRODUCTION
A block cipher is a family of permutations on a message space indexed by a secret key. Luby and Rackoff [1] introduced a theoretical model for the security of block ciphers by using the notion of pseudorandom and super-pseudorandom permutations. A pseudorandom permutation can be interpreted as a block cipher that cannot be distinguished from a truly random permutation regardless of how many polynomial encryption queries an attacker makes. A super-pseudorandom permutation can be interpreted as a block cipher that cannot be distinguished from a truly random permutation regardless of how many polynomial encryption and decryption queries an attacker makes.
Luby and Rackoff used a Feistel-type transformation defined by the typical two-block structure of the block cipher DES in order to construct pseudorandom and super-pseudorandom permutations from pseudorandom functions [1] . They showed that the Feistel-type transformation with three rounds yields a 2n-bit pseudorandom permutation and with four rounds it yields a 2n-bit super-pseudorandom permutation under the assumption that each round function is an n-bit pseudorandom function. Patarin [2] proved that one could obtain similar results by using only a single pseudorandom function. Naor and Reingold [3] revisited the revised constructions of Luby and Rackoff and simplified their proofs of security.
There were also some noticeable results for the pseudorandomness of a MISTY-type transformation defined by another typical two-block structure of the block cipher MISTY [4] , [5] different from the Feistel-type. Sakurai and Zheng [6] showed that the three-round MISTY-type transformation does not give a pseudorandom permutation and the four-round does not give a super-pseudorandom size. The pseudorandomness criteria can be used in the theoretical study of the soundness of a basic structure used in some block ciphers.
On the other hand, Knudsen [15] proved that any Feistel cipher with a bijective round function has the impossible characteristics of five rounds, which allows us to distinguish the five-round cipher from a randomly chosen permutation. Recently, Patarin [16] also discussed a generic distinguishing attack on five-round Feistel-type permutations. This distinguishing attack can be applied to KASUMI since the round functions FO and FL are permutations. Patarin ) computations to distinguish a five-round 2n-bit Feistel-type permutation from a 2n-bit random permutation. The mixed 4n-bit block KASUMI-like structure, which is studied in this paper, is different from the 2n-bit block Feistel-type structure, so the structures of Patarin's attack and our analysis are different from each other. Note that the number of queries in the practical distinguishing attack is exponential in its block size. This point is different from an analysis of pseudorandomness.
II. THE BLOCK CIPHER KASUMI
The block cipher KASUMI [11] produces a 64-bit output from a 64-bit input under the control of a 128-bit key. KASUMI is a modified version of the block cipher MISTY1 [5] , and we can classify the structure of KASUMI into the following three stages:
• The overall structure of KASUMI is a 64-bit permutation composed of eight rounds of a Feistel-type permutation. The round function consists of a non-linear mixing function FO and a linear mixing function FL.
• The FO function is a 32-bit permutation composed of three rounds of a MISTY-type transformation with round permutation FI.
• The FI function is a 16-bit permutation which is composed of a four-round unbalanced MISTY-type transformation obtained from the 7-bit S-box S7 and the 9-bit S-box S9.
The structure of KASUMI is depicted in Fig. 1 .
A security evaluation of KASUMI was primarily performed by the 3GPP Security Algorithms Group of Experts (SAGE) [17] . The general conclusion of [17] was that KASUMI is based on sound design principles and no practical attacks were found. We believe that the notion of pseudorandomness is theoretical evidence of the soundness of the basic structure of a block cipher. However there was no mention in [17] about the pseudorandomness criteria. This provided the motivation of our study, in which we examine the pseudorandomness of the block structures used in KASUMI. Kühn [18] showed that KASUMI with six rounds can be breakable by impossible differential attack with complexity of 2 55 data and 2 100 times, which is less than an exhaustive search.
Kühn's attack shows that KASUMI with six rounds is not practically secure, whereas we theoretically show that the simplified KASUMI with four rounds is pseudorandom where the number of queries is polynomially bounded.
III. PRELIMINARIES FOR PSEUDORANDOMNESS
Let n I denote the set of all n-bit strings and n Ω be the set of all permutations from n I to itself where n is a positive integer, that is,
is a bijection }. We define an n-bit perfect random permutation as a uniformly drawn element of . We define two transformations, Feistel-type and MISTYtype, which are obtained from two representative structures of current block ciphers. Let n Ψ denote the set of all functions from n I to itself. We say f is an n-bit function (resp. permutation) where
Definition 8. For any n-bit function n f Ω ∈ , the 2n-bit
Now we can formally describe several important results on the pseudorandomness of Feistel-type and MISTY-type transformations. Note that a pseudorandom function ensemble (PFE) can be similarly defined as in Definition 4 by considering a function space instead of a permutation space.
is not a 2n-bit PPE and
) are independently chosen from an n-bit PFE [1] .
is a 2n-bit PPE and
) is chosen independently from an n-bit PPE [6] , [7] .
We first show that the structure of the FI function of KASUMI is a PPE by examining the pseudorandomness of an unbalanced MISTY-type transformation. Second, on the basis of the first result, we prove that a three-round KASUMI-like structure is not a PPE but a four-round KASUMI-like structure is a PPE. Note that the structure of the FO function of KASUMI is not a PPE, so it seems that unlike the LubyRackoff cipher, the three-round Feistel-type permutation of a KASUMI-like structure is not a PPE. Since the FL function is used to mix in the round key, we consider in this paper a simplified version of KASUMI without the FL function.
IV. PSEUDORANDOMNESS OF THE UNBALANCED MISTY-TYPE TRANSFORMATION
We describe two simple but useful lemmas, the proofs of which are given in [8] . n Ω Then for any
Now we define two unbalanced MISTY-type transformations in order to examine accurately the pseudorandomness of the FI function. 
and for any
where for any n-bit vector x , x denotes the m-bit value obtained by discarding the n-m leftmost bits and for any m-bit vector y , y denotes the n-bit value obtained by adding n-m zero bits to the left.
Note that the FI function of KASUMI can be represented as a 16-bit permutation
, where 1 f , 3 f are 9-bit permutations and 2 f , 4 f are 7-bit permutations. We define the permutation ensemble based on the FI function as follows.
Definition 10. m n+

Λ
is the (n + m)-bit permutation ensemble obtained from the four-round unbalanced MISTYtype transformation ,
and
are independently chosen from the n-bit and m-bit UPEs, respectively.
The pseudorandomness of the FI function is guaranteed by the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let for any positive integers n and m with
, and
be independently chosen from two n-bit and m-bit PPEs, respectively. Then the four-round unbalanced MISTY-type transformation 
Under the adaptive distinguisher model, the i-th query of D is determined by the first i-1 query-answer pairs and D's output is a function of its transcript. Throughout this paper we assume that all queries are distinct.
For the proof of Theorem 1, we consider an (n + m)-bit ensemble 
Note that the UPE Λ is also small enough.
To prove this fact, we first formally define a bad event and estimate its probability.
Definition 14.
For any n-bit permutation 1 f and m-bit permutation 2 f , ) , ( 
For any fixed j i ≠ , we estimate probabilities of these three events. We have the following three cases.
Case 1:
Observe that, by a similar result to Lemma 1,
(
and .
In this case the probability of the first event is equal to
. By Lemma 1, the probability of the second event is estimated as ) (
the probability of the third event is also equal to ) (
Otherwise, the probability of the third event is equal to ( )
By Lemma 1, the probability of the first event is estimated as ) (
Similarly, by Lemma 2, the probability of the second event is also estimated as
, by Lemma 2, the probability of the third event is estimated as ( )
the probability of the third event is also bounded above by .
Therefore, for any case, we obtain that 
σ Therefore, for any XOR-distinct σ , we obtain that ( ) Then we obtain that ( ) 
We first estimate the term (2) . Note that m n T + Λ is not XORdistinct if and only if for some , 
By Lemma 5, the term (3) is zero and by Lemma 4, the value of (5) Proof of Theorem 1: By using Lemma 3 and 6, we complete the proof as follows: 
V. PSEUDORANDOMNESS OF THE SIMPLIFIED KASUMI
From Theorem 1, it is reasonable to assume that the FI function of KASUMI is a PPE. In order to investigate the pseudorandomness of KASUMI, we use a simplified figure of KASUMI. The four-round simplified KASUMI is illustrated in Fig. 2, . Hence we obtain by an argument similar to that of Sakurai and Zheng [6] At this point, we consider the non-adaptive distinguisher security model, which is different from the one in section IV. The non-adaptive distinguisher sends all queries to the oracle at the same time, whereas the adaptive distinguisher determines the i-th query from the first i-1 query-answer pairs. We have experienced that under the adaptive distinguisher model, there are many factors involved in controlling a 4n-bit block structure. The following theorem guarantees that KASUMI with four or more rounds is a pseudorandom permutation ensemble under the security model with a non-adaptive distinguisher.
Theorem 3. If
in Fig. 2 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work we examined the pseudorandomness of the 3GPP block cipher KASUMI. We have proved that the structure of the FI function within a KASUMI composed of a four-round unbalanced MISTY-type structure is a pseudorandom permutation under a security model with an adaptive distinguisher. We have shown that the simplified KASUMI with three rounds is not a pseudorandom permutation ensemble, but a four-round simplified KASUMI is a pseudorandom permutation ensemble under a non-adaptive distinguisher model. Under an adaptive distinguisher model it is necessary to consider many factors to control a 4n-bit block structure. Thus, we set aside the pseudorandomness of the KASUMI-like structure as an open problem.
The results of this paper disclose the soundness of the basic block structure of KASUMI from the viewpoint of pseudorandomness. Within the security architecture of the 3GPP system there are two standardized functions, the confidentiality function f8 and the integrity function f9. These two functions are based on the block cipher KASUMI. Thus the pseudorandomness of KASUMI is the main assumption on which to examine the provable security of f8 and f9. The results of this paper provide support for this assumption.
